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Law rms are expected to be controlled by the workers because
given the diculty of monitoring labor, the transaction cost would
be very high and the essential human capital investment would be
lacking in a rm controlled by the capital suppliers. Expectations are
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rmed by the data. However, following the same reasoning one
can easily suggest that software rms should also be controlled by
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rm uses very
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Firms have dierent organizational forms which can be classied in various
ways. One common classication takes control rights as the essential key.
Accordingly rms can be controlled by a subset of dierent input suppliers.
Inputs include labor, physical assets, nancial assets, raw materials, land or
any other resource which may be owned by an individual or a group.
As Gregory Dow (2003) puts it clearly, at the beginning of the twenty rst
century after more than two hundred years of scientic inquiry, economists
still do not have a good theory to explain why rms are usually owned and
controlled by the capital suppliers but not the labor suppliers. Even worse,
up until the last decades economics did not take this fundamental issue as
seriously as the subject deserves 1.
According to the prominent gure of transaction cost theory, Oliver E.
Williamson, some rms, mainly professional rms (law rms, accounting
rms, investment banking, consulting) involve negligible investment in rm-
specic physical assets and are expected to be appropriately organized as
worker-controlled partnerships (Williamson, 1985). Property rights theory
exemplied by Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1996) indicates that where
individuals possess knowledge which is critical to the rm, they should be
encouraged to invest in their proprietary knowledge by sharing in the owner-
ship of the rm and participating directly in the decision-making process. In
their words, an agent who is indispensable to the generation of surplus should
have ownership right and highly complementary assets should be owned to-
gether.
Law rms are expected to be controlled by the workers because given
the diculty of monitoring labor, the transaction cost would be very high
and the essential human capital investment would be lacking in a rm con-
trolled by the capital suppliers. Expectations are conrmed by the data.
However, following the same reasoning one can easily suggest that software
rms should also be controlled by the labor suppliers given the similar dif-
culty of monitoring labor and essential human capital. As in a law rm,
the software rm uses very generic capital such as oces, computers and
programming languages. Moreover, the human capital of the software devel-
1Robert Gibbons (2003: 754) writes for 200 years, the basic economic model of a rm
was a black box: labor and physical inputs went in one end and output came out the
other, at a minimum cost and maximum prot. Most economists paid little attention to
the internal structure and functioning of rms and other organizations.
3oper is indispensable and highly rm specic. While we observe widespread
worker control in terms of partnerships in legal service industry, the majority
of the software rms are not controlled by the labor suppliers: instead they
are controlled by the capital suppliers.
1.1 Software and Legal Services: Posing the Puzzle
Computer software is a stored, machine-readable code that instructs a com-
puter to carry out specic tasks. There are three basic types of computer
software: (1) operating systems such as Windows, UNIX or Linux, (2) ap-
plication tools such as accounting or inventory programs or (3) application
solutions such as spreadsheets (i.e. Excel). All three of these basic types of
software can be provided in either standard/packaged or custom form (Mow-
ery, 1996).
The development process of software consists of requirement analysis,
system design, detailed program design, coding, testing and installation as
well as redesign and repairs referred to as maintenance. Yet these phases
are usually more iterative than sequential, and often unpredictable in time
and costs, because the productivity of individual programmers tends to vary
substantially and depends on elements dicult for management to control,
such as personal talent and experience with particular application and pro-
gramming languages. Software producers may thus encounter budget and
schedule overruns as a rule rather than the exception, especially when at-
tempting to build large complex systems with new components being tested
for the rst time.
Most of the software programmers would hold that their jobs resemble
ne arts rather than engineering 2. Undoubtedly, the lawyers would argue
that being a good lawyer requires as much creativity as the job of software
programmers do. For organizations such as rms, what matters is the cost
of providing incentives for these highly transaction specic human capital
owners. In turn that cost depends on the cost of monitoring the performance
of the workers. By performance we mean the quality and the quantity of
the workers eort. For a principle such as an employer of a law rm or a
software rm, it may be very costly to monitor the agents. She will never be
sure of a software programmer who seems to be contemplating: she might be
daydreaming as well as visualizing a module that turns out to be critical for
2See for example Valverde and Sole (2003) and Glass (1996) to appreciate some of the
subtleties of software programming.
4the entire software project. The monitoring problem may be as acute for the
legal service rms as in the case of software rms. A lawyer spending con-
siderable amount of time in the library might be just killing time as well as
preparing hard for a case 3. Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 788) share our point:
[W]atching a mans activity is not a good clue to what he is actually think-
ing or doing with his mind[I]t is dicult to manage and direct a lawyer in the
preparation and presentation of a case[D]etailed direction in the preparation
of a law case would require in much greater detail that the monitor prepare
the case himself.
Yet while a substantial fraction of legal service rms are organized as
worker controlled enterprises in terms of partnerships, the bulk of the soft-
ware rms are investor owned and controlled capitalist corporations (see Ta-
ble 1 below). Given the importance of hard-to-monitor transaction specic
human capital assets in both sectors, the dominant organizational form in
the software industry seems to be puzzling.
In a more general setting Legros and Newman (1996) demonstrate that
when wealth constraints are binding (borrowing is costly) choice of organi-
zational form will depend on the distribution of wealth. They argue that
with enough inequality technically inecient organizational forms may be
chosen. Similarly, Bowles and Gintis (1996) show that distribution of wealth
and assignment of control rights are mutually determining. Their main point
is that when agents become wealthier they become less risk averse and save
more to self-nance their projects. Alternatively they can use their saving as
an equity stake when they engage in a credit relation if in doing so they can
alleviate the problems in the credit market for the sector requiring higher
capital per labor.
A related study by Nickerson and Silverman (2003) explains the choice
of organizational form in the inter-state trucking industry focusing on three
3At a rst glance, billable hours may seem to be a good proxy for performance and
hence decrease severity of the labor monitoring problem in law rms (See Hansmann.
1990). If billable hours are good proxy for performance, then the lawyers can be monitored
easily. Thus we would expect a governance structure for the law rms in which control is
exercised by capital suppliers rather than by the labor suppliers. The software developers
are required to report the code they have written at the end of a working day, the number
of code lines is then used to gauge their performance (See Cusumano. 1995). Compared to
the billable hours this method of monitoring labor lacks reliability in associating the link
between eort and output since thousands lines of code might be equivalent to a simple
module consisting a few lines to serve for a particular function (see Glass, 1995).
5types of asset specicity: the need to manage coordination across hauls, the
need to safeguard rm-specic investments in reputation and the need to
employ idiosyncratic vehicles. They try to give an answer to the puzzling
observation that truck drivers predominantly work for companies in spite
of their generic capital, i.e. trucks. In this paper we will try to explain
this puzzling fact by focusing on network externalities and transaction spe-
cic capital requirements characterizing the software market, but not the
legal services market. The paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses brie
y the partnerships and governance costs. The third section
introduces a model to formulate the analysis. The fourth section discusses
some empirical evidences supporting the argument. The fth section is an
extension on customized software and the last section concludes by pointing
out some implications for the open source software movement.
The studies on the organizational forms in general take the institutional
environment as fairly stable and look for a subset of parameters such as tax
rates applied to dierent organizational forms and technology that would in-

uence the choice of organizational form. Organizational forms available to
professional service rms vary in a range from the simple general partnership
(GP) form that had been the prevailing standard for centuries, to a multitude
of choices, including the professional association (PA), the professional corpo-
ration (PC), the limited liability partnership (LLP), and the limited liability
corporation (LLC). The only meaningful dierence between the GP and LLP
is that in the LLP, partners are liable only for partnership debts resulting
from their own conduct or the conduct of someone under their supervision.
In the GP all the partners are fully liable no matter what. It is important
to acknowledge the peculiar institutional framework in which the legal ser-
vice rms operate. Although the participants of the rms have substantial

exibility in choosing the organizational form, they are also constrained in
some important senses. First, even if they choose to adopt the professional
corporation form, the dominant shareholders should be the lawyers working
in the rm. Secondly, the legal framework for LLC and LLP was recently
established. The argument is that via organizational inertia, rms stay as
partnerships although the corporation form might be better suited.
Another caveat which calls for attention is the employment of non-partner
lawyers in the legal service rms be they in partnerships or corporations. In
this paper we pick these two industries to illustrate the fruitfulness of our the-
oretical approach rather than to make the claim that we can reveal the factors
that fully explain the choice of organizational forms in these industries. We
pick them because (1) in terms of labor process they can be argued to be sub-
6Table 1: Organizational Forms in Software and Legal Services
NAICS code Sector Corporations Partnerships Sole Proprietorships
54111 Oces of Lawyer
in Numbers 39.9 47.51 12.28
in Receipts 40.16 47.54 12.3
in Payroll 57.45 34.04 6.38
in Employment 46.86 37.24 15.48
51121 Software Publishers
in Numbers 92.14 3.28 4.28
in Receipts 98.54 0.81 0.32
in Payroll 98.66 0.75 0.34
in Employment 97.6 1.09 0.9
stantially similar, (2) they are based on human capital-intensive professional
services and (3) they substantially dier in terms of the transaction-specic
capital requirements. Nevertheless we have to acknowledge two additional
caveats. First, we lump all the law rms and all the software rms together
and use a stylized rm to compare and contrast the organizational forms
dominant in the sector. However we are aware that upper-tier legal service
rms, that oer legal advice and consulting services to large corporations
work, and organize dierently than the lower-tier small law rms. The same
qualication goes for the software rms. Large software rms often adopt
complex organizational forms and manage labor processes dierently than
the small, customized software-oriented software rms (Cusumano 1991).
Secondly, we do not delve into the specic analysis of the work organization
either in the legal service rm or in the software rms. What we emphasize
is the generic nature of physical capital and rm specic nature of human
capital required in both sectors.
2 Partnerships and Governance Structures
2.1 When do we expect Partnerships?
Although there does not exist a commonly accepted reason for why partner-
ships are observed in some industries but not others, several studies relate to
this question. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) focused on the incentive aspects
7of prot-sharing and the role of productivity measurement in determining
organizational form. They argue that professionals such as lawyers will be
less likely to be organized as traditional capitalist rms. Their reasoning de-
pends on the precarious link between the feasibility of monitoring eort and
the performance of the lawyers. At rst glance, partnerships resonate with
professional services. As Martin Gaynor and Paul Gertler (1995) claim, the
partnership form is apt to split xed costs and spread risk due to uncertainty.
Professionals often make signicant investments in their human capital, and
due to the lack of capital and insurance markets for these assets, these in-
vestments carry substantial risks. In order to partially insure themselves
against uncontrollable shocks, professionals form partnerships and share the
revenues.
Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis (2002) on the other hand suggest that
when the quality of a service is harder to evaluate by the market, this service
is more likely to be supplied by partnerships. In its oversimplied version,
their argument states that since partners would have to sacrice the average
product of their labor instead of the marginal product as in the case of cor-
porations, they would care more about their reputation. They employ this
insight to explain why law rms happen to be partnerships 4.
In a related study Carr and Matthewson (1990) point out that when
suppliers of a service are more knowledgeable than their clients, by creating
joint specic (brand name) capital that is at risk and by peer-monitoring
partnerships commit themselves to deliver their professional services hon-
estly. Partnerships, according to them, dominate sole proprietorships when
cases are rather complex, meaning that the clients could not monitor the law
rm easily. Henry Hansmann (1988; 1996) claims that worker ownership in
terms of partnerships or cooperatives may be the chosen organizational form
where the governance costs could be eectively minimized. He argues that in
law rms, partners are selected to form a homogenous group with homoge-
nous interests and in most cases equal pay policy is adopted to contain the
possibility of con
ict in decision-making processes within the organization.
Joseph Farell and Suzanne Scotcher (1998) also provide a model of part-
nerships with a tendency for the partners to assort themselves homogenously
according to similar ability levels. Eugene Kandel and Edward Lazear (1992)
extend the homogeneity argument to show that group level norms, such as
guilt and shame which can be internalized through peer pressure, can emerge
4However, they surprisingly argue that software is a product that can be relatively easy
for the market to assess the quality without explaining why that might be so.
8relatively easier if the partners are homogenous.
Partnerships have diculty raising investment capital partly because their
assets are intangible and highly mobile. Both Levin and Tadelis (2002) and
Hansmann (1996) claim that the need to raise capital in recent decades has
forced partnerships in some sectors such as advertisement, consulting and in-
vestment banking to convert themselves into corporations. In Table 2.2 below
we have summarized the main factors in
uencing the choice of organizational
form in general and the choice among a partnership and a corporation in par-
ticular.
2.2 Overall Governance Costs
It is argued by the Transaction Cost Theory that the control and ownership
of rms should go to the agents who could save the most in governance costs,
which would be incurred if they were employed in organizations owned by
others. These governance costs can be manifold, but essentially they origi-
nate from the transaction specicity of assets and agency costs arising due
to monitoring and contracting problems. Owners and controllers have to
pay high agency costs to employ dicult-to-monitor and transaction specic
assets.
Total governance costs may cover both the transaction costs and the pro-
duction costs. Frequently it is hard to distinguish the two (Bowles, 2004).
Suppose investor owned capitalist rms try to minimize the governance costs.
They can either seek lower agency costs for the dicult-to-monitor, trans-
action specic unit labor or they can substitute capital for the high agency
cost labor. Therefore the elasticity of substitution among high agency cost
capital and high agency cost labor remains a critical issue.
Furthermore, the total costs may not be solely determined among the
agents within the rm. Assume that reputation, brand name or advertise-
ment is essential because the quality of the product is not standard and is
hard to be specied by customers; then the governance costs related with
marketing (i.e. agency costs of transaction specic advertisement) should
also be included in order to answer the question of who would be owners and
controllers of the rm. As we will discuss later, the network externalities
in software indeed make the governance costs associated with advertisement
and marketing the decisive factor in the choice of organizational form. We
do not mean that advertisement or investment in brand name and marketing
in legal services are not important. Simply due to the nature of the market
9Table 2.2: A Brief Categorization of the Arguments
A. Firm Structure Effect on the 
Partnerships
Main Causal Link
A.1. Negligible Physical 
Assets
+ Decrease the need for external 
finance
A.2. Proprietary Knowledge 
generating Surplus
+  Increases the Governance Costs 
(Agency Costs of Labor) in 
Corporations
A.3. Wealth Constraints - Puts extra costs due to lack of 
collateral 
A.4. Network Externalities 
and TSC Requirements
- With A.3. increases the Agency 
Costs of Capital




B.1. Variability in Input 
Costs
+/- Partnerships are more flexible
B.2. Non-standard + Partnerships signal quality
B.3. Difficulty of Assessing 
Quality by the Market 
+ Partnerships internalize the 
Reputation 
B.4. Networking  -  Increases the TSC requirements
C. Characteristics 
of Labor
C.1. Difficulty of 
Monitoring
+ Increases Governance (Agency 
Costs of Labor) in Corporations
C.2. Risky Human Capital + Partnerships provide Insurance
C.3. Objective Function  - If net income per worker is 
maximized then partnerships will 
be smaller or larger than the 
optimal size
D. Characteristics 
of the Industry 
D.1. Competitiveness + Increases the Importance of 
Reputation (given equal total unit 
costs)
D.2. Outsourcing + Decreases the need for external 
finance
D.3. Networking in Public 
Goods
+ Decreases TSC requirements
10in legal services, usually localized and based on personal networks, the asso-
ciated governance costs are miniscule compared to those associated with the
software case. The quality and the success of the law rms can be judged
easily by the market participants as a by-product of the past services or by
the common knowledge of reputation. The observation of the success rate in
the relevant cases in the past might be more important for corporate clients
of the large law rms. Individuals choose their lawyers by asking their peers
or their friends, who might know a signal about the expected quality of the
services.
3 A Framework for Analysis
3.1 A Simple Benchmark Model
As we have argued, the dominant organizational form in the software in-
dustry, namely the investor owned corporation, poses an empirical puzzle
for economists. Since the physical capital used for production of software
goods and services is generic and contractible1, the rst-best outcome can
be achieved if the workers (in our case software programmers) could optimize
the production function by varying their eort level and the level of capital,
which they can lease or own. There arises the question about the adequate
objective function of a worker managed cooperative or a partnership. The
literature is divided. One group asserts that the natural objective function
would be maximization of net income per partner. Others argue that the
workers would simply maximize the net surplus, which gives equivalence in
terms of strategic behavior with the capitalist rm. The choice of objective
function matters for the input demand decisions. If one takes the former, net
income per partner, as the goal there appear counter intuitive results: the
worker controlled rms decrease their demand for labor when the price for
its product rises and increase their demand for labor when the price for its
product falls. However, the latter objective function makes more sense and
it corresponds to the empirical reality more closely. Following the general
discussion of organizational equilibria in Ugo Pagano and Robert Rowthorn
(1996), lets assume two dierent organizational forms, an investor owned
capitalist corporation (C) and a worker controlled partnership (P) dened
by the identity of their ultimate control groups2 (Dow, 2003). They are as-
sumed to be competing in the same institutional setting, employing the same
technology and facing the same output and input market conditions. Then
their respective per unit net revenues (normalizing output prices to 1) would
be:
11C = Q(k;K;l;L)   rk   RK   wl   (W + H)L
K = Q(k;K;l;L)   rk   RK   wl   (W + H)L
where Q is a common production function,  is net prots, superscripts
C and P indicate a capitalist rm and a partnership respectively, r is rental
price in the generic capital goods market and w is the competitive wage set
by the market for generic labor; K and L denote the amounts of transaction-
specic, hard-to-monitor capital and labor assets required in the production
activity and R and W are competitive input prices for the former and for
the latter. Z and H, accordingly, re
ect the respective agency costs (the ad-
ditional cost). Z is the additional cost of using transaction-specic capital if
the capital suppliers do not control the rm and H is the additional cost to
use hard-to-monitor labor if the labor suppliers do not control the rm.
The concept of dicult-to-monitor is introduced by Alchian and Demsetz
(1972). If the owners of the rm own the capital employed in the organization,
then they have an incentive to take care of their capital. When user-induced
depreciation is dicult to monitor, the possibility of careless use makes the
rental of dicult-to-monitor capital more expensive than its ownership. A
possible remedy would be that the workers/partners instead of renting the
capital goods may borrow credit to buy the capital goods. However, since
dicult-to-monitor capital is less valuable as collateral than easy-to-monitor
capital (mainly because it is generally more dicult to liquidate in case of
bankruptcy) it will be more expensive to rent the dicult-to-monitor capital
than the easy-to-monitor capital. This extra cost can be seen as a proxy for Z.
Nevertheless, note that the critical issue is the extra cost that a worker
controlled rm bears relative to the investor controlled rm. On the one hand
we can argue, as Alchian and Demsetz do, that workers would have a better
incentive structure take care of their capital and this would oset at least
partially any higher cost of borrowing for the worker controlled rm that
has dicult-to-monitor capital. On the other hand the creditor might prefer
to deal with only a few people as the CEOs of the investor controlled rms
instead of the collective body of worker-partners (Gintis 1989). That would
add a premium to the real cost of debt nance for the worker controlled rms.
Hansmann (1990) argues that where capital is needed to purchase rm-
specic assets it may be very costly or impossible for a worker-owned rm to
obtain the necessary capital by borrowing it on the market. The problem is
12that the creditors expose themselves to the threat of opportunistic behavior
by the worker-owners, who have an incentive to appropriate for themselves
the amounts that are borrowed by simply distributing the credit as raises
in wages and then declaring bankruptcy. Without physical assets that can
be pledged as security to the lenders, there may in fact be no feasible way
in which the owners can commit themselves not to behave in such an op-
portunistic fashion. Again the issue of the adequate objective function plays
a decisive role in this context. If the objective function is chosen as maxi-
mization of net income per worker, there may be an incentive for the existing
workers to loot the rm of its capital goods because of the time horizon prob-
lem. As the incumbent workers could not benet from the income accruing
from their investment when they retire or lose their jobs for any reason in the
future, they would have an incentive not to invest optimally or if investment
is made, to reap the benets immediately by over-using the capital or simply
selling the capital goods before they leave the rm.
On the other hand if the capital is generic as in the case of transporta-
tion rms where much of the capital is invested in vehicles that are easily
resold, worker ownership in terms of self-employment frequently appears. In-
vestment banking also requires substantial capital per worker but the rms
assets are highly fungible and therefore a substantial amount of worker own-
ership in the form of partnerships can be observed, at least up to the recent
decades There are no common denitions of asset specicity or agency costs.
Menard (2004) for example denes specicity of assets as the value of invest-
ments that would be lost in any alternative3. Pagano and Rowthorn (1996)
refer to the specicity of assets as a measure of the diculty of employing
the resources in other organizations.
As is apparent from the unit net revenue functions, when the capital
suppliers own and control the rm they could save the agency costs due to
the transaction-specic, hard-to-monitor capital assets, (K). Symmetrically,
when the labor suppliers own and control the rm they could save the agency
costs due to the transaction-specic, hard-to-monitor human capital assets,
(L). For the generic labor and capital assets, both types of rms have to
bear the market determined factor prices4. Given a competitive market for
control and ownership rights of the rms5, the fundamental insight of the
Coase Theorem suggests that the suppliers of the factor who could save the
highest opportunity costs by avoiding the associated agency costs will ac-
quire the ownership and control rights of the rm in consideration. With
some rearranging of 3.1 and 3.1 we can see that investor owned corporations
will prevail if
13ZK   HL > 0
And alternatively partnership will be dominant organizational form if
HL   ZK > 0
Now it can be shown that for any standard production function and for
any set of generic factors with market determined prices (w, W, r, R, l; k,l),
there exists at least one pair of (H, Z) of agency costs that makes multiple
organizational equilibria exist.
For our case of legal services and software, it is perfectly plausible that
the transaction-specic, hard-to-monitor assets would be human capital as-
sets. After all, lawyers and software programmers use computers, books and
oces, which are easily redeployable general assets. Transaction-specic and
hard-to-monitor assets would be the ability, intellectual capacity and the cre-
ativity of lawyers and software programmers. In a sense, this simple model
re
ects the predictions of transaction cost theory or property rights school
on the choice of organizational forms.
From equations 3.1 and 3.1 we can get a line (see Figure 2.1 below)
which divides the space of high agency cost of transaction-specic-capital
and high agency cost of labor times the labor-capital ratio. We would expect
partnerships to the bottom-right of the line and capitalist rms to the top-
left. By its seemingly generic capital requirements and critical high agency
costs of labor software rms may be located near the law rms at the bottom-
left. However, as we argued, given the imperfect capital markets and wealth
constraints, the software developers face substantially higher agency costs (Z)
due to the transaction specic capital requirements, such as advertisement.
Graphically they move to the top-left section as indicated by the arrow (see
Figure 2.1 below).
3.2 Transaction-Specic Capital Due to Network Ex-
ternalities
We will now underline the fact that although in the software market there
are certain demand and supply network externalities that force rms to bear
the high agency costs of transaction specic capital, law rms do not face
such costs.

















15As we have mentioned in the introduction, software products and services
come in various forms along a continuum of customized products and services
to mass-market prepackaged products1. The latter form constitutes the bulk
of the software market, accounting for more than 80 percent of all revenues
within the sector (45 billion dollars in 1997 according to Economic Census).
What distinguishes prepackaged software is its characteristic of being a net-
work good. Network goods are characterized by increasing returns to scale,
by lock-in and especially by supply and demand externalities. The last fea-
ture implies that consumers behavior is not only aected by the price but
also by their expectation of the size of the network in which the same product
will be used (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Economides, 1995). Advertisement in
a network good market in
uences the expectations of the potential consumer
with regards to the future network size. As Ionnes Economides (1995) and
Luca Grilli (2002) show, given consumers independent preferences there ex-
ists a threshold level of advertisement that will guarantee a critical mass in
terms of the size of the consumer network. Thus, start-up rms as well as
established software rms should take the advertisement eect into account.
It is no surprise that Microsoft spent almost 1 billion dollars to promote
Windows operating system in 1995 (Chwe, 2001: 81). We note that adver-
tisement is only one possible indicator of asset specic capital. Research and
Development expenditures, brand name premium, an index of the value of
the tacit knowledge embodied in the rm or a ratio of residual transaction
specic capital (after all the generic capital is deducted from the overall cap-
ital stock) to labor expenses would all be proxies for the share of transaction
specic capital. Unfortunately, these data are very hard to reach and are
most of the time not very reliable. If our conjectures hold for the single case
of advertisement then the likelihood of conrming our conjectures with the
complete can be argued to be considerably higher.
In the industrial organization literature there are well known arguments
on how advertisement as an endogenous sunk cost acts as an eective en-
try barrier (Kessides, 1986; Sutton, 1992). Coupled with the widespread
network externalities in the software market, we simply show that the trans-
action specic nature of advertisement would increase Z, the high agency
costs, suciently to impede the viability of partnerships.
Advertisement can be thought as a transactions specic capital (Mocnick
2001), therefore as long as the investor-owned corporations could save the
high agency costs of transaction specic capital, any productive eciency
advantage of worker owned rms could be more than oset by the capital
16cost disadvantage. The critical factor is that worker owned rms would be
credit rationed or credit constrained, and thus would have to pay a dieren-
tial cost on the loans they take for investing in transaction specic capital
such as advertisement2.
A recent example from India provided by Banerjee and Du
o (2001)
demonstrates how it is more costly to borrow with intangible transaction
specic assets. However, the problem, they point out is not peculiar to
the developing country framework. Indian bankers in the 1980s and early
1990s were puzzled by how they could justify lending to software companies,
since their only real assets were their software engineers and their work-in-
progress was lines of program codes on the computers. Another example of
the eect of transaction specic capital requirements on credit constraints is
provided by a study by Nickerson and Silverman (2000). They explain why
self-employment is not the dominant organizational form in the trucking in-
dustry; they nd that econometrically advertisement has a signicant eect
on the choice of being employed in a capitalist rm.
When the workers/partners are wealth constrained3, they can only bor-
row by posting collateral. However, the major part of the expenses they will
have to make is transaction specic such as advertisement: the higher the
transaction specicity the lower the value of collateral. It is straightforward
to show theoretically that as the value of collateral decreases the unit cost of
borrowing increases4 (Banerjee 2001, Bowles 2004).
4 Discussion
4.1 Advertisement and Organizational Forms in Ser-
vice Sectors
The straightforward way to test our claim would be to gather advertisement
share data for sectors and check whether those with less advertisement or
transaction specic capital expenses also have substantial number of part-
nerships. We use the Economic Census Data of 1997. First from the data
on legal form of organization we extract the distribution of organizational
forms for some service sectors according to SIC code specication. Then we
match these gures with the shares of advertisement expenses in total ex-
penses. We expect a negative relationship between the ratios of partnerships
to corporations on the one the hand and the relative share of advertisement
in total expenses on the other hand. The Figure 2.2 (see below) conrms our
17Table 3: Asset Specic Capital
Firms Year Advertisement Expenses Advertisement Expenses
in total Expenses in total Sales
Legal Research Center 1999 19 9
2000 17.7 8.3
2001 12.6 6




The outlier in terms of the high relative share of advertisement is as ex-
pected the Motion Picture sector (with SIC code of 781). The other two
outliers lie on the axis of partnerships share: Legal Services (81) and Hotels
and Motels (701). There is a negative non-parametric rank correlation coe-
cient (measured as Spearmans Rho) at a value of between the two variables,
although the condence interval is not within conventional levels. When the
outliers are excluded (see Figure 2.3 below), we can say that the share of ad-
vertisement in total expenses and the fraction of partnerships are negatively
correlated with a 95 percent condence level (the value of the coecient is
0.30). The very small size of our sample makes further econometric analysis
very dicult.
4.2 Firm-Level Comparison
In order to have a grasp on the relative share of transaction specic capital
costs related with advertisement, we compare a software rm with a law rm.
We accept the charge that Microsoft may not be a typical software rm but
we use it to illustrate our point in a dramatic way. Robert Hall et al (2003)
for example mentions that over the years 1995 through 2002, Microsoft spent
22 percent of its revenue on sales and marketing.
As it is apparent, the relative share of advertisement expenses for Mi-
crosoft is dramatically greater than of the Legal Research Center, a law rm.
We picked the Legal Research Center not as a typical rm in the legal ser-
vices industry. It can be considered to be one of the big law rms. This
strengthens our point because if the share of advertisement expenses in such
a rm is considerably lower than of the software rm, we would condently
expect that it would be more so in a typical law rm which is localized and
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19advertises by word of mouth. As long as the software rms have to bear
these transaction specic capital expenses, the partnerships would be disad-
vantaged in raising sucient capital and in reaching a critical network size
to compete with the capitalist rms.
4.3 Documenting Network Externalities
Succi et al (1999) argues that network externalities play a major role in
the protability of a software product. There are indeed empirical studies
specifying the eects of network externalities on the behavioral patterns of
software rms and customers. Erik Brynjolfsson and Chris Kemerer (1993),
in an econometric study of network externalities in the microcomputer soft-
ware market, nd that installed base (the network size) could be treated
on a par with intrinsic product quality in aecting the market value of the
spreadsheets1. The study nds that a one percent increase in a products
installed base was associated with a 0.75Neil Gandal (1994) conrms that
network externalities exist in the PC software market by examining the ef-
fect of LOTUS compatibility of various spreadsheets on the valuation of the
customers and nds signicant network eects. Both studies suggest that
further research should examine the strategic behavior of software rms to
determine the extent to which they invest in installed base by increasing ad-
vertisement. They indicate that dierent rms may have to choose dierent
strategies depending on the constraints on their nances.
5 Implications
5.1 Customized Products and Services: Software as
Consultancy
The above model and the discussion imply that when there exists a market
niche of customized software products or services in which network external-
ities and thus advertisement does not play a major role, we would expect
more rms owned and controlled by their workers.
In such a situation the problem boils down to the R and D question:
is it more ecient for the rms (or customers) to have in-house R and D
or to outsource R and D projects (Aghion and Tirole, 1994)? If the latter
is more ecient, there are a priori advantages for the worker owned rms
such as partnerships or cooperatives to carry out those outsourced R and D
20projects. Philipe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1994: 1206) argue that
[R]esearch will be more likely conducted in an integrated structure if (a)
capital inputs are substantial relative to intellectual inputs in contrast, when
intellectual inputs dominate as for software and biotechnology, research will
often be performed by independent units; (b) the customer has more bar-
gaining power ex ante, say because of intense competition among potential
research teams and (c) the customer has a deep pocket.
For the customized software niche markets, although (a) may favor worker
owned research teams, (b) and (c) would hamper the relative advantage of
such rms.
5.2 Open Source Software
One consequence of our model and argument can at least partially shed
some light on the puzzling Open Source Software movement. Free distribu-
tion of open source software corresponds to the cheapest and most eective
advertisement strategy (in terms of in
uencing the expectations of the users
of the size of the market) for the worker owned rms. Once the software
is adopted by the critical network size, the customized maintenance, and
production teams organized as partnerships or cooperatives could carry out
consultancy and updating services1. They would perform more eciently
than the investor owned corporations. Ironically Microsoft used this strat-
egy to eliminate a real competition in the browser market when it bundled
its web browser (Explorer) with its operating System (windows): it simply
made impossible that its rival Netscape reach a critical network size.
5.3 Why not Benetton-Style Outsourcing?
If advertisement is the issue to be solved why not a private for-prot rm
emerges, outsource the software projects, and then market them by its brand
name as Benetton has done for the textile sector? We think the answer lies
again in the dierences of the nature of the products. Casual wear textile
products are standardized and hence it has been relatively cheap for Benet-
ton to specify the characteristics and control the quality of the product of
its many suppliers. In other words, after having committed to make adver-
tisement and marketing campaigns for particular products, Benetton would
not feel the pressure of hold-up threat due to the lack of quality. A software
marketing rm on the other hand could not specify and control the quality
of a particular product with such ease as Benetton has enjoyed for decades.
21Commuo et. al. (2001) conrms our insight arguing that:
However, in the apparel industry, time compression does not depend so
much on the tailoring phase as on the supply of raw materials. Therefore
over the years, Benetton has gradually increased upstream vertical integra-
tion to consolidate its textile and thread suppliers. Today, Benetton's main
supplier of raw materials { which guarantees that it will provide 60 per-
cent of the woven fabric, 90 percent of cotton knit fabric and 90 percent
of carded and combed wool { is 85 percent controlled by Benetton itself.
Both upstream vertical integration and partnership relationships with exter-
nal suppliers have made it possible for Benetton to exercise quality control
over textiles and thread sooner. The materials then can be sent directly to
workshops and external producers without further controls, reducing trans-
port costs and production-lead times overall.
6 Conclusion
We have showed that legal services dier from software in an important
aspect. Software products generally require substantial amounts of adver-
tisement, which is transaction specic due to the network externalities. High
agency costs associated with such transaction specic capital inhibit evolu-
tionary tness of the worker controlled (and owned) rms, such as partner-
ships and cooperatives. In an ideal world with perfect credit markets anyone
could borrow at the ongoing real interest rate. Then software developers
could lease or borrow to acquire the rm-specic dicult-to-monitor capi-
tal goods necessary for advertisement and reputation concerns. Doing so,
they could enjoy fully the benets of saving the high agency costs of their
dicult-to-monitor labor. Thereby, the likelihood of partnerships displacing
the capitalist rms increases. In social welfare terms the outcome might be
more ecient because in the case of partnerships the high agency costs of
capital as well as the high agency costs of labor would be avoided. In the
reverse case of capitalist rms, due to the nature of software development
process and inalienability of rm specic human assets (just like in legal ser-
vices), the high agency costs of labor will remain even if the high agency
costs of dicult-to-monitor capital can be saved. If and only if the process
of software development is standardized and hence labor of software devel-
opers become generic and easy-to-monitor high agency cost of labor would
disappear.
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